Santiago v. Comm Social Security by unknown
2005 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-12-2005 
Santiago v. Comm Social Security 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2005 
Recommended Citation 
"Santiago v. Comm Social Security" (2005). 2005 Decisions. 1376. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2005/1376 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2005 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Case No:  04-2546
ANNA M. SANTIAGO, o/b/o
GUIDO SANTIAGO
               Appellant
          v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
                                                          
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
District Court No.:  02-CV-05126
District Judge:  The Honorable William G. Bassler
                                                          
Submitted Pursuant to LAR 34.1(a)
March 29, 2005
Before:  ALITO, SMITH and ROSENN, Circuit Judges
(Filed:  April 12, 2005)
                                                         
OPINION OF THE COURT
                                                         
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Anna M. Santiago, on behalf of her son Guido Santiago, appeals from the decision
of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Guido’s application for child
    The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).  We exercise1
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
2
Supplemental Security Income benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act.   Our1
review is limited to determining “whether there is substantial evidence to support the
Commissioner’s decision.”  Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999). 
Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla.  It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”  Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Regulation § 416.924 sets out the three-step sequential analysis for determining
child disability claims.  20 C.F.R. § 416.924.  Under this analysis, a child is disabled if:
(1) he is neither working nor engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) he has a
medically determinable impairment that is severe; and (3) the medically determinable
severe impairment meets, medically equals, or functionally equals a listing in Appendix 1
of the regulations.  20 C.F.R. § 416.924 (referring to § 416.925 (incorporating 20 C.F.R.
Part 404, subpart P, Appendix 1)).  An impairment functionally equals a listed impairment
in Appendix 1 if the child has “‘marked’ limitations in two domains of functioning or an
‘extreme’ limitation in one domain.”  20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(a).  Six domains are to be
considered: acquiring and using information; attending and completing tasks; interacting
and relating with others; moving about and manipulating objects; caring for yourself; and,
health and physical well-being.  20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(1).
3Here, the ALJ found that Guido was not working, and that Guido had asthma and
borderline intellectual functioning that were severe impairments.  As these impairments
neither met nor equaled the criteria of any listed impairment, the ALJ concluded that
Guido was not disabled.  The ALJ pointed out that Guido’s asthma was controlled with
medication, that he was able to participate in gym classes and that he had not required
hospitalization for any exacerbations of his asthma.  Further, the ALJ determined that
Guido’s borderline intellectual functioning was not disabling, because his functional
limitations were neither “extreme” in one domain nor “marked” in two.  
Mrs. Santiago asserts that the ALJ erred at step three in the analysis by finding that
Guido did not meet or equal the criteria of a listing.  In her view, the ALJ erred because
he completely failed to explain why her son’s impairments did not medically equal a
listing and that he made no findings with regard to whether Guido’s impairments
functionally equaled a listing.  Mrs. Santiago contends that the ALJ’s analysis is contrary
to our instruction in Burnett v. Commissioner, 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir. 2000), that
ALJs must fully explain what listings are considered and why an impairment does not
equal the criteria of a listed impairment. 
In Burnett, we were troubled by the fact that the ALJ summarily concluded that the
plaintiff’s severe impairment did not satisfy or equal any of the impairments listed in
Appendix 1 of the regulations. Id.  We noted that the ALJ had failed to identify the
relevant listing, to discuss the evidence or explain his conclusion.  Relying on our
4precedent in Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704-05 (3d Cir. 1981), which required ALJs
to set forth the reasons for their decisions, we concluded that the ALJ’s conclusory
statement precluded meaningful  judicial review, and we remanded for further
proceedings.  
Here, as the District Court noted, the ALJ did not summarily conclude that Guido’s
impairments did not medically equal a listed impairment.  Rather, the ALJ considered the
medical evidence and relied upon the opinions of state physicians and psychologists that
Guido’s asthma and borderline intellectual functioning did not satisfy or equal a listed
impairment.  As the District Court observed, “[a]pproximately four and a half pages of
the ALJ’s decision are devoted to analyzing Guido’s limitations with respect to the six
domains of functioning, based on medical evidence and school reports in the record.”
That analysis allows for meaningful review, and we conclude that there is substantial
evidence to support the ALJ’s determination that Guido’s medical status did not
medically equal the criteria of a listed impairment.
Nor do we find any error regarding the ALJ’s determination that Guido’s condition
was not functionally equivalent to a listed impairment.  The ALJ carefully considered
Guido’s functional limitations in each of the six domains, and there is substantial
evidence to support his conclusion that Guido’s limitations were not as severe as those set
forth in the listings.
We will affirm the judgment of the District Court, upholding the Commissioner’s
5denial of SSI benefits to Guido Santiago.
